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Abstract
In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on
elections—attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding/deleting
candidates or voters. That work has led to many results on how algorithms can be used
to find attacks on elections and how complexity-theoretic hardness results can be used as
shields against attacks. However, all the work in this line has assumed that the attacker
employs just a single type of attack. In this paper, we model and study the case in
which the attacker launches a multipronged (i.e., multimode) attack. We do so to more
realistically capture the richness of real-life settings. For example, an attacker might
simultaneously try to suppress some voters, attract new voters into the election, and
introduce a spoiler candidate. Our model provides a unified framework for such varied
attacks, and by constructing polynomial-time multiprong attack algorithms we prove
that for various election systems even such concerted, flexible attacks can be perfectly
planned in deterministic polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Elections are a central model for collective decision-making: Actors’ (voters’) preferences
among alternatives (candidates) are input to the election rule and a winner (or winners in
the case of ties) is declared by the rule. Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick initiated a line of
research whose goal is to protect elections from various attacking actions intended to skew
∗Also appears as URCS-TR-2010-960.
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the election’s results. Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick’s strategy for achieving this goal
was to show that for various election systems and attacking actions, even seeing whether
for a given set of votes such an attack is possible is NP-complete. Their papers [BTT89a,
BO91,BTT92] consider actions such as voter manipulation (i.e., situations where a voter
misrepresents his or her vote to obtain some goal) and various types of election control
(i.e., situations where the attacker is capable of modifying the structure of an election,
e.g., by adding or deleting either voters or candidates). Since then, many researchers have
extended Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick’s work by providing new models, new results,
and new perspectives. But to the best of our knowledge, until now no one has considered
the situation in which an attacker combines multiple standard attack types into a single
attack—let us call that a multipronged (or multimode) attack.
Studying multipronged control is a step in the direction of more realistically modeling
real-life scenarios. Certainly, in real-life settings an attacker would not voluntarily limit
himself or herself to a single type of attack but rather would use all available means of
reaching his or her goal. For example, an attacker interested in some candidate p winning
might, at the same time, intimidate p’s most dangerous competitors so that they would
withdraw from the election, and encourage voters who support p to show up to vote. In
this paper we study the complexity of such multipronged control attacks.1
Given a type of multiprong control, we seek to analyze its complexity. In particular,
we try to show either that one can compute in polynomial time an optimal attack of that
control type, or that even recognizing the existence of an attack is NP-hard. It is particularly
interesting to ask about the complexity of a multipronged attack whose components each
have efficient algorithms. We are interested in whether such a combined attack (a) becomes
computationally hard, or (b) still has a polynomial-time algorithm. Regarding the (a) case,
we give an example of a natural election system that displays this behavior. Our paper’s core
work studies the (b) case and shows that even attacks having multiple prongs can in many
cases be planned with perfect efficiency. Such results yield as immediate consequences all
the individual efficient attack algorithms for each prong, and as such allow a more compact
presentation of results and more compact proofs. But they go beyond that: They show that
the interactions between the prongs can be managed without such cost as to move beyond
polynomial time.
Related work. Since the seminal paper of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], much
research has been dedicated to studying the complexity of control in elections. Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] considered constructive control only, i.e., scenarios where the
goal of the attacker is to ensure some candidate’s victory. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra,
and Rothe [HHR07] extended their work to the destructive case, i.e., scenarios in which the
goal is to prevent someone from winning.
A central but elusive goal of control research is finding a natural election system (with
a polynomial-time winner algorithm) that is resistant to all the standard types of control,
i.e., for which all the types of control are NP-hard. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and
1In fact, our framework of multiprong control includes the unpriced bribery of [FHH09a] and can be
extended to include manipulation.
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Rothe [HHR09] showed that there exist highly resistant artificial election systems. Fal-
iszewski et al. [FHHR09a] then showed that the natural system known as Copeland voting
is not too far from the goal mentioned above. And Erde´lyi, Rothe, and Nowak [ENR09]
then showed a system with even more resistances than Copeland, but in a slightly non-
standard voter model (see [BEH+] for discussion and [EPR10b,EPR10a,Men10] for some
related follow-up work).
Recently, researchers also started focusing on the parameterized complexity of control
in elections. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a] provided several fixed-parameter tractability
results. Betzler and Uhlmann [BU09] and Liu et al. [LFZL09] showed so-called W[1]- and
W[2]-hardness results for control under various voting rules. In response to the conference
version of the present paper [FHH09b], Liu and Zhu conducted a parameterized-complexity
study of control in maximin elections [LZ10].
Going in a somewhat different direction, Meir et al. [MPRZ08] bridged the notions
of constructive and destructive control by considering utility functions, and in this model
obtained control results for multiwinner elections. In multiwinner elections the goal is to
elect a whole group of people (consider, e.g., parliamentary elections) rather than just a
single person. Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko [EFS10] and Chevaleyre et al. [MLCM10]
considered two types of problems related to control by adding candidates for the case where
it is not known how the voters would rank the added candidates.
Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09c] and Brandt et al. [BBHH10] have studied control (and
manipulation and bribery) in so-called single-peaked domains, a model of overall electorate
behavior from political science.
There is a growing body of work on manipulation that regards frequency of
(non)hardness of election problems (see, e.g., [CS06,FKN08,DP08,XC08b,XC08a,Wal09]).
This work studies whether a given NP-hard election problem (to date only manipula-
tion/winner problems have been studied, not control problems) can be often solved in
practice (assuming some distribution of votes). Such results are of course very relevant
when one’s goal is to protect elections from manipulative actions. However, in this paper
we typically take the role of an attacker and design control algorithms that are fast on all
instances.
Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09b,FHH] provide an overview of some complexity-of-election
issues.
Organization. In Section 2 we present the standard model of elections and describe
relevant voting systems. In Section 3 we introduce multiprong control, provide initial results,
and show how existing immunity, vulnerability, and resistance results interact with this
model. In Section 4 we provide a complexity analysis of voter and candidate control in
maximin elections, showing how multiprong control is useful in doing so. We also show that
maximin has an interesting relation to Dodgson elections: No candidate whose Dodgson
score is more than m2 times that of the Dodgson winner(s) can be a maximin winner.
In Section 5 we consider fixed-parameter complexity of multiprong control, using as our
parameter the number of candidates. Section 6 provides conclusions and open problems.
3
2 Preliminaries
Elections. An election is a pair (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is the set of candidates
and V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a collection of voters. Each voter vi is represented by his or her
preference list.2 For example, if we have three candidates, c1, c2, and c3, a voter who likes
c1 most, then c2, and then c3 would have preference list c1 > c2 > c3.
3 Given an election
E = (C, V ), by NE(ci, cj), where ci, cj ∈ C and i 6= j, we denote the number of voters in V
who prefer ci to cj . We adopt the following convention for specifying preference lists.
Convention A. Listing some set D of candidates as an item in a preference list means
listing all the members of this set in some fixed, arbitrary order, and listing
←−
D means listing
all the members of D, but in the reverse order.
An election system is a mapping that given an election (C, V ) outputs a setW , satisfying
W ⊆ C, called the winners of the election.
We focus on the following five voting systems: plurality, Copeland, maximin, approval,
and Condorcet. (However, in Sections 4.4 and 5 we take a detour through some other
systems.) Each of plurality, Copeland, maximin, and approval assigns points to candidates
and elects those that receive the most points. Let E = (C, V ) be an election, where
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn). In plurality, each candidate receives a single point
for each voter who ranks him or her first. In maximin, the score of a candidate ci in E is
defined as mincj∈C−{ci}NE(ci, cj). For each rational α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, in Copeland
α candidate
ci receives 1 point for each candidate cj, j 6= i, such that NE(ci, cj) > NE(cj , ci) and α
points for each candidate cj , j 6= i, such that NE(ci, cj) = NE(cj , ci). That is, the parameter
α describes the value of ties in head-to-head majority contests. In approval, instead of
preference lists each voter’s ballot is a 0-1 vector, where each entry denotes whether the voter
approves of the corresponding candidate (gives the corresponding candidate a point). For
example, vector (1, 0, 0, 1) means that the voter approves of the first and fourth candidates,
but not the second and third. We use scoreE(ci) to denote the score of candidate ci in
election E (the particular election system used will always be clear from context).
A candidate c is a Condorcet winner of an election E = (C, V ) if for each other candidate
c′ ∈ C it holds that NE(c, c
′) > NE(c
′, c). Clearly, each election has at most one Condorcet
winner. (Not every election has a Condorcet winner. However, as our notion of an election
allows outcomes in which no one wins, electing the Condorcet winner when there is one and
otherwise having no winner is a quite legal election system.)
Computational complexity. We use standard notions of complexity theory, as presented,
e.g., in the textbook of Papadimitriou [Pap94]. We assume that the reader is familiar with
the complexity classes P and NP, polynomial-time many-one reductions, and the notions
of NP-hardness and NP-completeness. N will denote {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
2We also assume that each voter has a unique name. However, all the election systems we consider
here—except for the election system of Theorem 3.8—are anonymous and thus disregard voter names and
the order of the votes.
3Preference lists are also called preference orders, and in this paper we will use these two terms inter-
changeably.
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Most of the NP-hardness proofs in this paper follow by a reduction from the well-known
NP-complete problem exact cover by 3-sets, known for short as X3C (see, e.g., [GJ79]).
In X3C we are given a pair (B,S), where B = {b1, . . . , b3k} is a set of 3k elements and
S = {S1, . . . , Sn} is a set of 3-subsets of B, and we ask whether there is a subset S
′ of
exactly k elements of S such that their union is exactly B. We call such a set S′ an exact
cover of B.
In Section 5, we consider the fixed-parameter complexity of multiprong control. The
idea of fixed-parameter complexity is to measure the complexity of a given decision problem
with respect to both the instance size (as in the standard complexity theory) and some
parameter of the input (in our case, the number of candidates involved). For a problem
to be said to be fixed-parameter tractable, i.e., to belong to the complexity class FPT, we
as is standard require that the problem can be solved by an algorithm running in time
f(j)nO(1), where n is the size of the encoding of the given instance, j is the value of the
parameter for this instance, and f is some function. Note that f does not have to be
polynomially bounded or even computable. However, in all FPT claims in this paper, f is
a computable function. That is, our algorithms actually achieve so-called strongly uniform
fixed-parameter tractability. We point readers interested in parameterized complexity to,
for example, Niedermeier’s book [Nie06].
3 Control and Multiprong Control
In this section we introduce multiprong control, that is, control types that combine several
standard types of control. We first provide the definition, then proceed to analyzing general
properties of multiprong control, then consider multiprong control for election systems for
which the complexity of single-prong control has already been established, and finally give
an example of an election system for which multiprong control becomes harder than any of
its constituent prongs (assuming P 6= NP).
3.1 The Definition
We consider combinations of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters4 and by bribing
voters. Traditionally, bribery has not been considered a type of control but it fits the model
very naturally and strengthens our results.
In discussing control problems, we must be very clear about whether the goal of the
attacker is to make his or her preferred candidate the only winner, or is to make his or
her preferred candidate a winner. To be clear on this, we as is standard will use the
term “unique-winner model” for the model in which the goal is to make one’s preferred
candidate the one and only winner, and we will use the term “nonunique-winner model”
for the approach in which the goal is to make one’s preferred candidate be a winner. (Note
that if exactly one person wins, he or she most certainly is considered to have satisfied the
4Other control types, defined by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] and refined by Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07], regard various types of partitioning candidates and voters.
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control action in the nonunique-winner model. The “nonunique” in the model name merely
means we are not requiring that winners be unique.)
The destructive cases of each of these are, in the nonunique-winner model, blocking
one’s despised candidate from being a unique winner,5 and in the unique-winner model,
blocking one’s despised candidate from being a winner. We take the unique-winner model
as the default in this paper, as is the most common model in studies of control.
Definition 3.1. Let E be an election system. In the unique-winner,6 constructive E-
AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control problem we are given:
(a) two disjoint sets of candidates, C and A,
(b) two disjoint collections of voters, V and W , containing voters with preference lists
over C ∪A,
(c) a preferred candidate p ∈ C, and
(d) five nonnegative integers, kAC, kDC, kAV, kDV, and kBV.
We ask whether it is possible to find two sets, A′ ⊆ A and C ′ ⊂ C, and two subcollections
of voters, V ′ ⊆ V and W ′ ⊆W , such that:
(e) it is possible to ensure that p is a unique winner of E election ((C − C ′) ∪ A′, (V −
V ′) ∪ W ′) via changing preference orders of (i.e., bribing) at most kBV voters in
(V − V ′) ∪W ′,
(f) p /∈ C ′, and
(g) ‖A′‖ ≤ kAC, ‖C
′‖ ≤ kDC, ‖W
′‖ ≤ kAV, and ‖V
′‖ ≤ kDV.
In the unique-winner, destructive variant of the problem, we replace item (e) above with: “it
is possible to ensure that p is not a unique winner of E election ((C−C ′)∪A′, (V −V ′)∪W ′)
via changing preference orders of at most kBV voters in (V −V
′)∪W ′.” (In addition, in the
destructive variant we refer to p as “the despised candidate” rather than as “the preferred
candidate,” and we often denote him or her by d.)
The phrase AC+DC+AV+DV+BV in the problem name corresponds to four of the
standard types of control: adding candidates (AC), deleting candidates (DC), adding voters
(AV), deleting voters (DV), and to (unpriced) bribery (BV); we will refer to these five types
of control as the basic types of control. We again remind the reader that traditionally
bribery is not a type of control but we will call it a basic type of control for the sake of
uniformity and throughout the rest of the paper we will consider it as such.
5We will often use the phrase “a unique winner,” as we just did. The reason we write “a unique winner”
rather than “the unique winner” is to avoid the impression that the election necessarily has some (unique)
winner.
6One can easily adapt the definition to the nonunique-winner model.
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Instead of considering all of AC, DC, AV, DV, and BV, we often are interested in some
subset of them and so we consider special cases of the AC+DC+AV+DV+BV problem.
For example, we write DC+AV to refer to a variant of the AC+DC+AV+DV+BV problem
where only deleting candidates and adding voters is allowed. As part of our model we
assume that in each such variant, only the parameters relevant to the prongs are part of
the input. So, for example, DC+AV would have kDC, kAV, C, V , W , and p as the (only)
parts of its input. And the “missing” parts (e.g., for DC+AV, the missing parts are A, kAC,
kDV, and kBV) are treated in the obvious way in evaluating the formulas in Definition 3.1,
namely, missing sets are treated as ∅ and missing constants are treated as 0. If we name
only a single type of control, we in effect degenerate to one of the standard control problems.
We for historical reasons consider also a special case of the AC control type, denoted ACu
(and called control by adding an unlimited number of candidates), where there is no limit
on the number of candidates to add, i.e., kAC = ‖A‖.
There is at least one more way in which we could define multiprong control. The model
in the above definition can be called the separate-resource model, as the extent to which
we can use each basic type of control is bounded separately. In the shared-resource model
one pool of action allowances must be allocated among the allowed control types (so in
the definition above we would replace kAC, kDC, kAV, and kDV with a single value, k, and
require that ‖C ′‖+ ‖D′‖+ ‖V ′‖+ ‖W ′‖+ the-number -of -bribed-voters ≤ k). Although one
could make various arguments about which model is more appropriate, their computational
complexity is related.
Theorem 3.2. If there is a polynomial-time algorithm for a given variant of multiprong
control in the separate-resource model then there is one for the shared-resource model as
well.
Proof. Let E be an election system. We will describe the idea of our proof on the example of
the constructive E-AC+AV problem. The idea easily generalizes to any other set of allowed
control actions (complexity-theory savvy readers will quickly see that we, in essence, give a
disjunctive truth-table reduction).
We are given an instance I of the constructive E-AC+AV problem in the shared-resource
model, where k is the limit on the sum of the number of candidates and voters that we may
add. Given a polynomial-time algorithm for the separate-resource variant of the problem,
we solve I using the following method. (If k > ‖A‖ + ‖W‖ then set k = ‖A‖ + ‖W‖.)
We form a sequence I0, . . . , Ik of instances of the separate-resource variant of the problem,
where each Iℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, is identical to I, except that we are allowed to add at most ℓ
candidates and at most k − ℓ voters. We accept if at least one of Iℓ is a “yes”-instance of
the separate-resource, constructive E-AC+AV problem. Clearly, this algorithm is correct
and runs in polynomial time.
It would be interesting to consider a variant of the shared-resource model where var-
ious actions come at different costs (e.g., adding some candidate c′ might be much more
expensive—or difficult—than adding some other candidate c′′). This approach would be
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close in spirit to priced bribery of [FHH09a]. Analysis of such priced control is beyond the
scope of the current paper.
3.2 Susceptibility, Immunity, Vulnerability, and Resistance
As is standard in the election-control (and election-bribery) literature, we consider vulner-
ability, immunity, susceptibility, and resistance to control. Let E be an election system and
let C be a type of control. We say that E is susceptible to constructive (destructive) C
control if there is a scenario in which effectuating C makes someone become (stop being) a
unique winner of some E election E. E is immune to constructive (destructive) C control
if E is not susceptible to constructive (destructive) C control. We say that E is vulnerable
to constructive (destructive) C control if E is susceptible to constructive (destructive) C
and there is a polynomial-time algorithm that decides the constructive (destructive) E-C
problem. Actually, this paper’s vulnerability algorithms/proofs will each go further and will
in polynomial time produce, or will make implicitly clear how to produce, the successful
control action. So we in each case are even achieving the so-called certifiable vulnerabil-
ity of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07]. E is resistant to constructive
(destructive) C control if E is susceptible to (destructive) C control and the constructive
(destructive) E-C problem is NP-hard.
The next three theorems describe how multiprong control problems can inherit suscep-
tibility, immunity, vulnerability, and resistance from the basic control types that they are
built from.
Theorem 3.3. Let E be an election system and let C1+ · · ·+Ck be a variant of multiprong
control (so 1 ≤ k ≤ 5 and each Ci is a basic type of control). E is susceptible to constructive
(destructive) C1+· · ·+Ck control if and only if E is susceptible to at least one of constructive
(destructive) C1, . . . , Ck control.
Proof. The “if” direction is trivial: The attacker can always choose to use only the type
of control to which E is susceptible. As to the “only if” direction, it is not hard to see
that if there is some input election for which by a C1 + · · · + Ck action we can achieve
our desired change (of creating or removing unique-winnerhood for p, depending on the
case), then there is some election (not necessarily our input election) for which one of those
actions alone achieves our desired change. In essence, we can view a control action A of
type C1 + · · · + Ck as a sequence of operations, each one of one of the C1, . . . , Ck types,
that—when executed in order—transform our input election into an election where our goal
is satisfied. Thus there is a single operation within A—and this operation is of one of the
types C1, . . . , Ck—that transforms some election E
′ where our goal is not satisfied to some
election E′′ where the goal is satisfied.
In the next theorem we show that if a given election system is vulnerable to some basic
type of control and is immune to another basic type of control, then it is vulnerable to
these two types of control combined. The proof of this theorem is easy, but we need to be
particularly careful as vulnerabilities and immunities can behave quite unexpectedly. For
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example, it seems that we can assume that if an election system is vulnerable to AV and DV
then it should also be vulnerable to BV, because bribing a particular voter can be viewed
as first deleting this voter and then adding—in his or her place—a voter with the preference
order as required by the briber. (This assumes we have such a voter among the voters we can
add, but when arguing susceptibility/immunity we can make this assumption.) However,
there is an easy election system that is vulnerable to both AV and DV control, but that
is immune to BV control. This system simply says that in an election E = (C, V ), where
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn), the winner is the candidate ci such that n ≡ i − 1
(mod m).7
Theorem 3.4. Let E be an election system and let C1+ · · ·+Ck+D1+ · · ·+Dℓ be a variant
of multiprong control (so 1 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ 5 and each Ci and each Di is a basic control type) such
that E is vulnerable to constructive (destructive) C1 + · · · + Ck control but is immune to
constructive (destructive) D1+· · ·+Dℓ control. E is vulnerable to C1+· · ·+Ck+D1+· · ·+Dℓ
control.
Proof. We will give a proof for the constructive case only. The proof for the destructive
case is analogous. Let E be an election system as in the statement of the theorem and let
I be an instance of constructive E-C1 + · · · + Ck + D1 + · · · +Dℓ control, which contains
election E = (C, V ), information about the specifics of control actions we can implement,
and where the goal is to ensure that candidate p is a unique winner. Let us first consider
the case where BV is not among C1, . . . , Ck,D1, . . . Dℓ.
Let us assume that there is a sequence A of control actions of types C1, . . . Ck,D1, . . . ,Dℓ,
such that (a) applying A to E is a legal control action within I, and (b) applying A to E
results in an election EC+D where p is the unique winner. (We take A to be an empty
sequence if p is a unique winner of E.) We split the sequence A into a subsequence AC
that contains exactly the actions of types C1, . . . , Ck, and a subsequence AD that contains
exactly the actions of types D1, . . . ,Dℓ. Since BV is not among our control actions, it is
easy to see that it is possible to apply actions AC to election E to obtain some election EC .
(To see why it is important that we do not consider BV, assume that BV is among control
types C1, . . . , Ck and AV is among control types D1, . . . ,Dℓ. In this case, AC might include
an action that bribes a voter that is added by an action from AD.)
We claim that p is a unique winner of EC . For the sake of contradiction, let us assume
that this is not the case (note that this implies that p is not a unique winner of E). If we
apply control actions AD to EC , we reach exactly election EC+D, where p is the unique
winner. Yet, this is a contradiction, because we assumed that E is immune to D1+ · · ·+Dℓ,
i.e., that there is no scenario where control action of typeD1+· · ·+Dℓ makes some candidate
a unique winner if he or she was not a unique winner before.
Thus, it is possible to ensure that p is a unique winner by actions of type C1 + · · ·+Ck
alone. We chose I arbitrarily, and thus any instance of E-C1 + · · · + Ck + D1 + · · · + Dℓ
control can be solved by an algorithm that considers control actions of type C1 + · · · + Ck
7Of course, this election system is not neutral; permuting the names of the candidates can change the
outcome of an election.
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only. This proves that E is vulnerable to C1 + · · ·+Ck +D1 + · · ·+Dℓ control because, as
we have assumed, it is vulnerable to C1 + · · · + Ck control.
It remains to prove the theorem for the case where BV is among our control actions. In
the case where BV is among the control actions but AV is not, or if AV and BV are in the
same group of actions (i.e., either both are among the Ci’s or both are among the Di’s), it
is easy to see that the above proof still works. Similarly, if BV is among the Di’s and AV
is among the Ci’s, the above proof works as well. The only remaining case is if our allowed
control types include both BV and AV, where BV is among the Ci’s and AV is among the
Di’s.
In this last case, the proof also follows the general structure of the previous construction,
except that we have to take care of one issue: It is possible that sequence AC includes bribery
of voters that are to be added by actions from AD. (We use the same notation as in the
main construction.) Let VBV be the collection of voters that AC requires to bribe, but that
are added in AD. We form a sequence A
′
C that is identical to AC , except that it starts by
adding the voters from VBV, and we let A
′
D be identical to AD, except that it no longer
includes adding the voters from VBV. Using sequences A
′
C and A
′
D instead of AC and AD, it
is easy to show the following: If it is possible to ensure that p is a unique winner in instance
I by a legal action of type C1 + · · · + Ck +D1 + · · · +Dℓ, then it is also possible to do so
by a legal action of type C1 + · · ·+Ck +AV , where each added voter is also bribed. Thus,
given an instance I of E-C1 + · · · + Ck +D1 + · · · +Dℓ we can solve it using the following
algorithm. Let W be the collection of voters that can be added within I and let kAV be the
limit on the number of voters that we can add.
1. Let t be max(kAV, ‖W‖).
2. For each i in {0, 1, . . . , t} execute the next two substeps.
(a) Form instance I ′ that is identical to I, except i (arbitrarily chosen) voters from
W are added to the election.
(b) Run the E-C1 + · · ·+ Ck algorithm on instance I
′ and accept if it does.
3. If the algorithm has not accepted yet, reject.
It is easy to see that this algorithm is correct and, since E is vulnerable to C1 + · · · + Ck,
works in polynomial time. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 3.5. Let E be an election system and let C1 + · · · + Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ 5, be a variant
of multiprong control. If for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, E is resistant to constructive (destructive)
Ci control, then E is resistant to constructive (destructive) C1 + · · ·+ Ck control.
Proof. Let Ci be the control type to which E is resistant. Since E is susceptible to construc-
tive (destructive) Ci control, it follows by Theorem 3.3 that E is susceptible to constructive
(destructive) C1 + · · · + Ck control. And since the E-Ci constructive (destructive) control
problem is essentially (give or take syntax) an embedded subproblem of the E-C1+ · · ·+Ck
control problem, clearly E is resistant to C1 + · · · + Ck control.
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By combining the above three theorems, we obtain a simple tool that allows us to classify
a large number of multiprong control problems based on the properties of their prongs.
Corollary 3.6. Let E be an election system and let C1 + · · ·+Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ 5, be a variant
of multiprong control, such that for each Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, E is resistant, vulnerable, or
immune to constructive (destructive) Ci control. If there is an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that
E is resistant to constructive (destructive) Ci control then E is resistant to constructive
(destructive) C1 + · · · + Ck control. Otherwise, if there is an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that E
is vulnerable to constructive (destructive) Ci control then E is vulnerable to constructive
(destructive) C1 + · · · + Ck control. Otherwise, E is immune to constructive (destructive)
C1 + · · ·+ Ck control.
Theorem 3.5 immediately yields many “free” resistance results based on the previous
work on control. However, we will focus on the more interesting issue of proving that even
multiprong control is easy for some election systems whose control has already been studied
(in Section 3.3) and for candidate control in maximin (Section 4).
In general, we do not consider partition cases of control in this paper. However, we make
an exception for the next example, which shows how even types of control to which a given
election system is immune may prove useful in multiprong control. In constructive control
by partition of candidates (reminder: this is not a basic control type) in the ties-eliminate
model (PC-TE control type), we are given an election E = (C, V ) and a preferred candidate
p ∈ C, and we ask whether it is possible to find a partition (C1, C2) of C (i.e., C1 ∪C2 = C
and C1 ∩C2 = ∅) such that p is a winner of the following two-round election: We first find
the winner sets, W1 and W2, of elections (C1, V ) and (C2, V ). If W1 (W2) contains more
than one candidate, we set W1 = ∅ (W2 = ∅), since we are in the “ties eliminate” model.
The candidates who win election (W1 ∪ W2, V ) are the winners of the overall two-stage
election.
Now, let us look at constructive approval-AC+PC-TE control, where (by definition, let
us say) we first add new candidates and then perform the partition action. We consider an
approval election with two candidates, p and c, where p has 50 approvals and c has 100.
We are also allowed to add candidate c′, who has 100 approvals. Clearly, it is impossible
to make p a unique winner by adding c′. Exercising the partition action alone does not
ensure p’s victory either. However, combining both AC and PC-TE does the job. If we first
add c′ to the election and then partition candidates into {p} and {c, c′} then, due to the
ties-eliminate rule, p becomes the unique winner. It is rather interesting that even though
approval is immune to constructive AC control, there are cases where one has to apply AC
control to open the possibility of effectively using other types of control.
The above example is perhaps surprising in light of Theorem 3.4. In essence, in the proof
of that theorem we argue that if an election system is vulnerable to some basic control type
C but is immune to some other basic control type D, then it is also vulnerable to control
type C +D. We proved the theorem by showing that we can safely disregard the actions
of type D (assuming C does not include BV control type). The above example shows that
this proof approach would not work if we considered PC-TE in addition to the basic control
types.
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3.3 Combining Vulnerabilities
In the previous section we considered the case where separate prongs of a multiprong control
problem have different computational properties, e.g., some are resistant, some are vulnera-
ble, and some are immune. In this section we consider the case where an election system is
vulnerable to each prong separately, and we show how such vulnerabilities combine within
election systems for which control results were obtained in previous papers (see Table 2).
In particular, in the next theorem we show that for all the election systems considered
in [BTT92], [HHR07], and [FHHR09a], all constructive vulnerabilities to AC, DC, AV, DV,
and BV combine to vulnerabilities, and all destructive vulnerabilities to AC, DC, AV, DV,
BV combine to vulnerabilities.8 That is, for each election system studied in these three
papers, if it is separately vulnerable to some basic control types C1, . . . , Ck, where each
Ci ∈ {AC,DC,AV,DV,BV}, it is also vulnerable to C1 + · · ·+ Ck.
Theorem 3.7. (a) Plurality is vulnerable to both constructive AV+DV+BV control and
destructive AV+DV+BV control. (b) Both Condorcet and approval are vulnerable to
AC+AV+DV+BV destructive control. (c) For each rational α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα
is vulnerable to destructive AC+DC control.
Proof. (a) Let us consider an instance I of constructive plurality-AV+DV+BV control
where we want to ensure candidate p’s victory: It is enough to add all the voters who vote
for p (or as many as we are allowed) and then, in a loop, keep deleting voters who vote
for a candidate other than p with the highest score, until p is the only candidate with the
highest score or we have exceeded our limit of voters to delete. Finally, in a loop, keep
bribing voters who vote for a candidate other than p with the highest score to vote for p,
until p is the only candidate with the highest score or we have exceeded our limit of voters
to bribe. If p becomes a unique winner via this procedure, then accept. Otherwise reject.
We omit the easy proof for the destructive case.
(b) Let I be an instance of destructive Condorcet-AC+AV+DV+BV, where our goal is
to prevent candidate p from being a Condorcet winner (we assume that p is a Condorcet
winner before any control action is performed). It is enough to ensure that some candidate
c wins a head-to-head contest with p. Our algorithm works as follows.
Let C be the set of candidates originally in the election and let A be the set of candidates
that we can add (we take A = ∅ if we are not allowed to add any candidates). For each
c ∈ (C ∪A)− {p} we do the following:
1. Add as many voters who prefer c to p as possible.
2. Delete as many voters who prefer p to c as possible.
8Constructive bribery for plurality and constructive bribery for approval have been considered
in [FHH09a] and constructive and destructive bribery for Copeland has been studied in [FHHR09a]. In
Theorem 3.7 we—in effect—give polynomial-time algorithms for destructive bribery in plurality, approval,
and Condorcet. Constructive Condorcet-BV is NP-complete and this is implicitly shown in [FHHR09a,
Theorem 3.2].
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3. Among the remaining voters who prefer p to c, bribe as many as possible to rank c
first.
If after these actions c wins his or her head-to-head contest with p then we accept. If no
c ∈ (C ∪A)− {p} leads to acceptance, then we reject. It is easy to see that this algorithm
is correct and runs in polynomial time. (We point out that it is enough to add only a
single candidate, the candidate c that prevents p from winning, if he or she happens to be
a member of A).
For the case of approval, our algorithm works similarly, except the following differences:
We add voters who approve of c but not of p. We delete voters who approve of p but not of
c. For each remaining voter vi, if we still have not exceeded our bribing limit, if vi approves
of p but not of c, we bribe vi to reverse approvals on p and c. (Note that if we do not
exceed our bribing limit by this procedure, this means that each voter that approves of p
also approves of c and thus p is not a unique winner.) If these actions lead to p not being
a unique winner, we accept. If we do not accept for any c ∈ (C ∪A)− {p}, we reject.
(c) The idea is to combine Copelandα destructive-AC and destructive-DC algo-
rithms [FHHR09a]. We give the full proof for the sake of completeness.
Let us fix a rational value α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Given an election E and a candidate c in
this election, we write scoreαE(c) to denote Copeland
α score of c. Let I be an instance
of destructive Copelandα-AC+DC control, with an election E = (C, V ), where we can
add at most kAC spoiler candidates from the set A, and where we can delete at most kDC
candidates. Our goal is to ensure that some despised candidate d ∈ C is not a unique winner.
Our algorithm is based on the following simple observation of Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a].
For each candidate c ∈ C:
scoreα(C,V )(c) =
∑
c′∈C−{c}
scoreα({c,c′},V )(c).
Our goal is to prevent candidate d from being a unique winner. If d is not a unique winner,
we immediately accept. Otherwise, we seek a candidate c ∈ C ∪A such that we can ensure
that c’s score is at least as high as that of d. Thus, for each c ∈ C ∪A we do the following.
1. If c ∈ A, and kAC > 0, we add c to the election (and if c ∈ A but kAC = 0, we proceed
to the next c).
2. As long as we can still add more candidates, we keep executing the following operation:
If there is a candidate c′ ∈ A such that value a(c′) = scoreα({c,c′},V )(c)−score
α
({d,c′},V )(d)
is positive, we add a candidate c′′ ∈ A, for whom a(c′′) is highest.
3. As long as we can still delete candidates, we keep executing the following operation: If
there is a candidate c′ ∈ C such that value r(c′) = scoreα({d,c′},V )(d)− score
α
({c,c′},V )(c)
is positive, we delete a candidate c′′ ∈ C, for whom r(c′′) is highest.
4. If after these steps d is not a unique winner, we accept.
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If we do not accept for any c ∈ C ∪A, we reject.
It is easy to see that we never delete a candidate that we have added. Also, it is easy to
see that the algorithm works in polynomial time, and that it is correct. Correctness follows
from the fact that (a) in the main loop of the algorithm, when dealing with candidate
c ∈ C ∪ A, each addition of a candidate and each deletion of a candidate increases the
difference between the score of c and the score of d as much as is possible, and (b) the order
of adding/deleting candidates is irrelevant.
As witnessed by Theorem 3.7 and the results of Section 4, for all natural election systems
that we have considered, all constructive vulnerabilities combine and so do all destructive
ones. It is natural to wonder whether this is a necessary consequence of our model of
multiprong control or whether in fact there is an election system for which combining two
control types to which the system is vulnerable yields a multipronged control problem to
which the system is resistant. Theorem 3.8 shows that the latter is the case, even for a
natural (though rather unusual) election system.
In the thirteenth century, Ramon Llull proposed an election system that could be used
to choose popes and leaders of monastic orders (see [HP01,ML06]). In his system, voters
choose the winner from among themselves (so, the candidates are the same as the voters).
Apart from that, Llull’s voting system is basically Copeland1, the version of Copeland that
most richly rewards ties. Formally, we define the voting system OriginalLlull as follows:
For an election E = (C, V ), if the set of names of V , which we will denote by names(V ),
is not equal to C, then there are no winners. Otherwise, a candidate c ∈ C is a winner
if and only if it is a Copeland1 winner. Note that single-prong AC and AV control for
OriginalLlull don’t make all that much sense, and so it should come as no surprise that
OriginalLlull is vulnerable to both constructive AC control and constructive AV control. In
addition, we will show (by renaming and padding) that Copeland1-AV can be be reduced
to OriginalLlull1-AC+AV. Since Copeland1 is resistant to constructive control by adding
voters [FHHR09a], this then leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8. OriginalLlull is vulnerable to both constructive AC control and constructive
AV control but is resistant to constructive AC+AV control.
Proof. It is immediate that OriginalLlull is susceptible to constructive AC, AV, and (by
Theorem 3.3) AC+AV control. It is also easy to see that constructive OriginalLlull-AC
(AV) control is in P: If possible add candidates (voters) such that the set of voter names
is equal to the set of candidates, and then check if the preferred candidate is a unique
Copeland1 winner. If this is not possible, reject.
We will now show, via a reduction from constructive Copeland1-AV control (which is
NP-hard [FHHR09a]) that constructive OriginalLlull-AC+AV control is NP-hard. Let C
be a set of candidates, V and W be two disjoint collections of voters with preference lists
over C, p ∈ C the preferred candidate, and k ∈ N. The question is whether there exists
a subcollection W ′ ⊆ W of size at most k such that p is a unique Copeland1 winner of
(C, V ∪W ′). Without loss of generality, we assume that V is not empty.
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We will now show how to pad this election. For an OriginalLlull election to be non-
trivial, we certainly need to have the same number of candidates as voters (later, we will
also rename the voters so that they are the same as the candidates). If ‖V ‖ < ‖C‖, we want
to add a collection of new dummy voters V ′ such that ‖V ‖ + ‖V ′‖ = ‖C‖ and such that
adding V ′ to an election does not change the relative Copeland1 scores of the candidates.
This can be accomplished by letting half of the voters in V ′ vote C (recall Convention A)
and half of the voters in V ′ vote
←−
C . Of course, this can only be done if ‖V ′‖ is even.
So, we will do the following. If ‖V ‖ < ‖C‖, we add a collection of new voters V ′ such
that ‖V ′‖ = ‖C‖ − ‖V ‖ if ‖C‖ − ‖V ‖ is even, and ‖V ′‖ = ‖C‖ − ‖V ‖ + 1 if ‖C‖ − ‖V ‖
is odd. If ‖V ‖ ≥ ‖C‖, we let V ′ = ∅. Half of the voters in V ′ vote C and half of
the voters in V ′ vote
←−
C . In addition, we introduce a set A of new candidates such that
‖C‖+‖A‖ = ‖V ‖+‖V ′‖+‖W‖. Note that this is always possible, since ‖V ‖+‖V ′‖ ≥ ‖C‖.
We extend the votes of the voters (in V , V ′, and W ) to C ∪ A by taking their preference
order on C and following this by the candidates in A in some fixed, arbitrary order. Note
that this will have the effect that candidates in A will never be winners.
Let W ′ ⊆ W , A′ ⊆ A, E = (C, V ∪W ′), E′ = (C ∪ A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′). It is easy to see
that the following hold (recall that V is not empty).
1. For all d ∈ A′, score1E′(d) ≤ ‖A
′‖ − 1.
2. For all c ∈ C, score1E′(c) = score
1
E(c) + ‖A
′‖.
3. For all c, c′ ∈ C, c 6= c′, score1E(c)− score
1
E(c
′) = score1E′(c)− score
1
E′(c
′).
4. p is a unique Copeland1 winner of E if and only if p is a unique Copeland1 winner of
E′.
We are now ready to define the reduction. Name the voters such that names(V ∪V ′) ⊇ C
and names(V ∪ V ′ ∪W ) = C ∪A. Then map (C, V,W, p, k) to (C,A, V ∪ V ′,W, p, ‖A‖, k).
We claim that p can be made a unique Copeland1 winner of (C, V ) by adding at most k
voters from W if and only if p can be made a unique OriginalLlull winner of (C, V ∪V ′) by
adding (an unlimited number of) candidates from A and at most k voters from W .
First suppose that W ′ is a subcollection of W of size at most k such that p is the
unique Copeland1 winner of (C, V ∪W ′). Let A′ ⊆ A be the set of candidates such that
C ∪ A′ = names(V ∪ V ′ ∪ W ′). By item 4 above, p is the unique Copeland1 winner of
(C∪A′, V ∪V ′∪W ′), and thus p is the unique OriginalLlull winner of (C∪A′, V ∪V ′∪W ′).
For the converse, suppose that there exist A′ ⊆ A and W ′ ⊆ W such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ k,
and p is the unique OriginalLlull winner of (C ∪ A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′). Then p is the unique
Copeland1 winner of (C∪A′, V ∪V ′∪W ′), and, by item 4, p is the unique Copeland1 winner
of (C, V ∪W ′).
Thus our reduction is correct and, since it can be computed in polynomial time, the
proof is complete.
OriginalLlull is neutral (permuting the names of the candidates does not affect the
outcome of an election) but not anonymous (renaming the voters can change the outcome
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of an election). By sneakily building the preference orders of the voters into the names of
the candidates, we can make the system anonymous as well as neutral (at the price of losing
naturalness).
Theorem 3.9. There exists a neutral and anonymous election system E such that E is
vulnerable to both constructive AC control and constructive AV control but is resistant to
constructive AC+AV control.
Proof. We first describe E . On input (C, V ), an election, if there exists a set I ⊆ N+ and
bijections c from I to C and v from I to V such that for all i ∈ I, c(i) = (i,>i) where >i is
a preference order on I (i.e., we interpret candidate names as pairs consisting of a positive
integer and a preference order on I) and voter v(i) corresponds to candidate c(i) in the
sense that for all j, k ∈ I, j >i k if and only if c(j) > c(k) in voter v(i)’s preference order,
then the winners are exactly the Copeland1 winners. Otherwise, there are no winners.
Note that E is neutral and anonymous and basically the same as OriginalLlull. The
same argument as used for OriginalLlull in the proof of Theorem 3.8 shows that E is vulner-
able to constructive AC and AV control and susceptible to AC+AV control. To show that
constructive E-AC+AV control is NP-hard, we adapt the reduction from from construc-
tive Copeland1-AV control to constructive OriginalLlull-AC+AV control from the proof of
Theorem 3.8. Let C be a set of candidates, V and W be two disjoint collections of voters
with preference lists over C, p ∈ C the preferred candidate, and k ∈ N. Without loss of
generality, we assume that V is not empty. Let V ′ and A be as in the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Recall that ‖V ∪ V ′‖ ≥ ‖C‖ and ‖V ∪ V ′ ∪W‖ = ‖C ∪A‖. From the proof of Theorem 3.8
we have the following.
Claim 3.10. Let W ′ ⊆ W , A′ ⊆ A, E = (C, V ∪W ′), E′ = (C ∪A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′). p is a
unique Copeland1 winner of E if and only if p is a unique Copeland1 winner of E′.
We are now ready to define the reduction. We will first rename the candidates. Note
that renaming candidates does not change the outcome of a Copeland1 election. Number
the candidates in C ∪ A from 1 to ‖C ∪ A‖ such that the candidates in C are numbered
from 1 to ‖C‖. Number the voters in V ∪ V ′ ∪W from 1 to ‖V ∪ V ′ ∪W‖ (= ‖C ∪ A‖)
such that the voters in ‖V ∪ V ′‖ are numbered from 1 to ‖V ∪ V ′‖. Now rename candidate
i to ci = (i,>i) where >i is the preference order on {1, . . . , ‖C‖ + ‖A‖} such that for all
j, k ∈ {1, . . . , ‖C‖ + ‖A‖}, j >i k if and only if j > k in voter i. Rename all candidates
occurring in C, A, V , V ′, and W in this way. We claim that p can be made a unique
Copeland1 winner of (C, V ) by adding at most k voters from W if and only if p can be
made a unique E winner of (C, V ∪ V ′) by adding candidates from A and at most k voters
from W .
First suppose that W ′ is a subcollection of W of size at most k such that p is the
unique Copeland1 winner of (C, V ∪W ′). Let A′ ⊆ A be the set of candidates such that
C ∪A′ = {ci | voter i is in V ∪ V
′ ∪W ′}. By Claim 3.10, p is the unique Copeland1 winner
of (C ∪A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′), and thus p is the unique E winner of (C ∪A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′).
For the converse, suppose that there exist A′ ⊆ A and W ′ ⊆ W such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ k,
and p is the unique E winner of (C ∪ A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′). Then p is the unique Copeland1
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winner of (C ∪ A′, V ∪ V ′ ∪W ′), and by Claim 3.10, p is the unique Copeland1 winner of
(C, V ∪W ′).
Thus our reduction is correct and, since it can be computed in polynomial time, the
proof is complete.
4 Control in Maximin
In this section we initiate the study of control in the maximin election system. Maximin
is loosely related to Copelandα voting in the sense that both are defined in terms of the
pairwise head-to-head contests. In addition, the unweighted coalitional manipulation prob-
lem for maximin and Copelandα (α 6= 0.5) exhibits the same unusual behavior: It is in
P for one manipulator and NP-complete for two or more manipulators [XCPR09,FHS08,
FHS10]. Thus one might wonder whether both systems will be similar with regard to their
resistances to control. In fact, there are very interesting differences.
It is easy to see that maximin is susceptible to all basic types of constructive and destruc-
tive control. And so, by Theorem 3.3, to show vulnerability to constructive (destructive)
C control it suffices to give a polynomial-time algorithm that decides the constructive (de-
structive) E-C problem, and to show resistance to constructive (destructive) C control it
suffices to show that the constructive (destructive) E-C problem is NP-hard.
4.1 Candidate Control in Maximin
Let us now focus on candidate control in maximin, that is, on AC, ACu, and DC control
types, both in the constructive and in the destructive setting. As is the case for Copelandα,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, maximin is resistant to control by adding candidates.
Theorem 4.1. Maximin is resistant to constructive AC control.
Proof. We give a reduction from X3C. Let (B,S), where B = {b1, . . . , b3k} is a set of
3k elements and S = {S1, . . . , Sn} is a set of 3-subsets of B, be our input X3C instance.
We form an election E = (C ∪ A,V ), where C = B ∪ {p}, A = {a1, . . . , an}, and V =
(v1, . . . , v2n+2). (Candidates in A are the spoiler candidates, which the attacker has the
ability to add to election (C, V ).)
Voters in V have the following preferences. For each Si ∈ S, voter vi reports preference
list p > B−Si > ai > Si > A−{ai} and voter vn+i reports preference list
←−−−−−−
A− {ai} > ai >
←−
Si >
←−−−−
B − Si > p. Voter v2n+1 reports p > A > B and voter v2n+2 reports
←−
B > p >
←−
A .
We claim that there is a set A′ ⊆ A such that ‖A′‖ ≤ k and p is a unique winner of
(C ∪A′, V ) if and only if (B,S) is a “yes”-instance of X3C.
To show the claim, let E′ = (C, V ). For each pair of distinct elements bi, bj ∈ B, we have
that NE′(bi, bj) = n+1, NE′(p, bi) = n+1, and NE′(bi, p) = n+1. That is, all candidates in
E′ tie. Now consider some set A′′ ⊆ A, ‖A′′‖ ≤ k, and an election E′′ = (C∪A′′, V ). Values
of NE′′ and NE′ are the same for each pair of candidates in {p}∪B. For each pair of distinct
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elements ai, aj ∈ A
′′, we have NE′′(p, ai) = n+ 2, NE′′(ai, p) = n, and NE′′(ai, aj) = n+ 1.
For each bi ∈ B and each aj ∈ A
′′ we have that
NE′′(bi, aj) =
{
n if bi ∈ Sj,
n+ 1 if bi /∈ Sj,
and, of course, NE′′(aj , bi) = 2n+2−NE′′(bi, aj). Thus, by definition of maximin, we have
the following scores in E′′: (a) scoreE′′(p) = n + 1, (b) for each aj ∈ A
′′, scoreE′′(aj) = n,
and (c) for each bi ∈ B,
scoreE′′(bi) =
{
n if (∃aj ∈ A
′′)[bi ∈ Sj],
n+ 1 otherwise.
A′′ corresponds to a family S′′ of 3-sets from S such that for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, S′′
contains set Sj if and only if A
′′ contains aj. Since ‖A
′′‖ ≤ k, it is easy to see that p is a
unique winner of E′′ if and only if S′′ is an exact cover of B.
Copelandα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is resistant to constructive AC control, but for α ∈ {0, 1},
Copelandα is vulnerable to constructive control by adding an unlimited number of candi-
dates. It turns out that so is maximin. However, interestingly, in contrast to Copeland,
maximin is also vulnerable to DC control, and in fact even to ACu+DC control. Intuitively,
in constructive ACu+DC control we should add as many candidates as possible (because
adding a candidate generally decreases other candidates’ scores, making our preferred candi-
date’s way to victory easier) and then delete those candidates who stand in our candidate’s
way (i.e., those whose existence blocks the preferred candidate’s score from increasing).
Studying constructive ACu+DC control for maximin jointly leads to a compact, coherent
algorithm. If we were to consider both control types separately, we would have to give two
fairly similar algorithms while obtaining a weaker result.
Theorem 4.2. Maximin is vulnerable to constructive ACu+DC control.
Proof. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for constructive maximin-ACu+DC control.
The input contains an election E = (C, V ), a set of spoiler candidates A, a preferred
candidate p ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer kDC. Voters in V have preference lists over the
candidates in C ∪ A. We ask whether there exist sets A′ ⊆ A and C ′ ⊆ C such that (a)
‖C ′‖ ≤ kDC and (b) p is a unique winner of election ((C − C
′) ∪A′, V ). If kDC ≥ ‖C‖ − 1,
we accept immediately because we can delete all candidates but p. Otherwise, we use the
following algorithm.
Preparation. We rename the candidates in C and A so that C = {p, c1, . . . , cm} and A =
{cm+1, . . . , cm+m′}. Let E
′ = (C ∪A,V ) and let P = {NE′(p, ci) | ci ∈ C ∪A}. That
is, P contains all the values that candidate p may obtain as scores upon deleting some
candidates from E′. For each k ∈ P , let Q(k) = {ci | ci ∈ C∪A−{p}∧NE′(p, ci) < k}.
Intuitively, Q(k) is the set of candidates in E′ that prevent p from having at least k
points.
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Main loop. For each k ∈ P , our algorithm tests whether by deleting at most kDC candi-
dates from C and any number of candidates from A it is possible to ensure that p
obtains exactly k points and becomes a unique winner of E′. Let us fix some value
k ∈ P . We build a set D of candidates to delete. Initially, we set D = Q(k). It is
easy to see that deleting candidates in Q(k) is a necessary and sufficient condition for
p to have score k. However, deleting candidates in Q(k) is not necessarily sufficient
to ensure that p is a unique winner because candidates with scores greater or equal
to k may exist. We execute the following loop (which we will call the fixing loop):
1. Set E′′ = ((C ∪A)−D,V ).
2. Pick a candidate d ∈ (C ∪A)−D such that scoreE′′(d) ≥ k (break from the loop
if no such candidate exists).
3. Add d to D and jump back to Step 1.
We accept if C ∩D ≤ kDC and we proceed to the next value of k otherwise.
9 If none
of the values k ∈ P leads to acceptance then we reject.
Let us now briefly explain why the above algorithm is correct. It is easy to see that in
maximin adding some candidate c to an election does not increase other candidates’ scores,
and deleting some candidate d from an election does not decrease other candidates’ scores.
Thus, if after deleting candidates in Q(k) there still are candidates other than p with k
points or more, the only way to ensure p’s victory—without explicitly trying to increase
p’s score—is by deleting those candidates. Also, clearly, the only way to ensure that p has
exactly k points is by deleting candidates Q(k).
Note that during the execution of the fixing loop, the score of p might increase to some
value k′ > k. If that happens, it means that it is impossible to ensure p’s victory while
keeping his or her score equal to k. However, we do not need to change k to k′ in that
iteration of the main loop as we will consider k′ in a different iteration.
Maximin is also vulnerable to destructive AC+DC control. The proof relies on the
fact that (a) if there is a way to prevent a despised candidate from winning a maximin
election via adding some spoiler candidates then there is a way to do so by adding at most
2 candidates, (b) adding a candidate cannot increase the score of any candidate other than
the added one, and (c) deleting a candidate cannot decrease the score of any candidate
other than the deleted one. In essence, the algorithm performs a brute-force search for
the candidates to add and then uses the constructive maximin-DC control algorithm from
Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.3. Maximin is vulnerable to destructive AC+DC control.
9If we accept, D implicitly describes the control action that ensures p’s victory: We should delete from
C the candidates in C ∩D and add from A the candidates in A−D.
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Proof. We will first give an algorithm for destructive maximin-AC and then argue how
it can be combined with the algorithm from Theorem 4.2 to solve destructive maximin-
AC+DC in polynomial time.
Let us first focus on the destructive AC problem. Our input is an election E =
(C, V ), where C = {d, c1, . . . , cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn), a spoiler candidate set A =
{cm+1, . . . , cm′}, and a nonnegative integer kAC. The voters have preference orders over
C ∪ A. The goal is to ensure that d is not a unique winner of E via adding at most kAC
candidates from A.
Let us assume that there exists a set A′ ⊆ A such that d is not a unique winner of
election E′ = (C ∪A′, V ). Since d is not a unique winner of E′, there exists some candidate
c′ ∈ C ∪ A′ such that scoreE′(c
′) ≥ scoreE′(d). Also, by definition of maximin, there is
some candidate d′ ∈ C ∪A′ such that scoreE′(d) = NE′(d, d
′). As a consequence, d is not a
unique winner of election E′′ = (C ∪{c′, d′}, V ). The reason is that scoreE′′(d) = scoreE′(d)
(because both E′ and E′′ contain d′) and scoreE′′(c
′) ≥ scoreE′(c
′) (because adding the
remaining A′−{c′, d′} candidates to E′′ does not increase c′’s score). Thus, to test whether
it is possible to ensure that d is not a unique winner of E, it suffices to test whether there
is a set A′′ ⊆ A such that ‖A′′‖ ≤ min(2, kAC) and d is not a unique winner of (C ∪A
′′, V ).
Clearly, this test can be carried out in polynomial time.
Let us now consider the AC+DC case. The input and the goal are the same as before,
except that now we are also given a nonnegative integer kDC and we are allowed to delete
up to kDC candidates. We now describe our algorithm. For each set {c
′, d′} of up to 2
candidates, {c′, d′} ⊆ (C ∪A)− {d} we execute the following steps.
1. We check if ‖A∩ {c′, d′}‖ ≤ kAC (and we proceed to the next {c
′, d′} if this is not the
case).
2. We compute a set D ⊆ C − {d, c′, d′}, ‖D‖ ≤ kDC, that maximizes scoreE′(c
′), where
E′ = ((C ∪ {c′, d′})−D,V ).
3. If d is not a unique winner of E′ = ((C ∪ {c′, d′})−D,V ), we accept.
We reject if we do not accept for any {c′, d′} ⊆ (C ∪A)− {d}.
The intended role of d′ is to lower the score of d and keep it at a fixed level, while, of
course, the intended role of c′ is to defeat d. By reasoning analogous to that for the AC
case, we can see that there is no need to add more than two candidates. Thus, given {c′, d′},
it remains to compute the appropriate set D. In essence, we can do so in the same manner
as in the constructive AC+DC case.
Let k be some positive integer. We set D(k) = {ci ∈ C −{c
′, d′, d} | NE(c
′, ci) < k} and
we pick D = D(i), where i is as large as possible (but no larger than ‖V ‖) and ‖D‖ ≤ kDC.
Deleting candidates in D maximizes the score of c′, given that we cannot delete d and d′.
It is easy to see that this D can be computed in polynomial time.
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4.2 Control by Adding and Deleting Voters in Maximin
In this section we consider the complexity of constructive and destructive AV and DV con-
trol types. (We will consider bribery, BV, in the next section; recall that in this paper,
bribery is a basic control type, though it is usually treated separately in the literature.) In
the previous section we have seen that maximin is vulnerable to all basic types of construc-
tive and destructive candidate control except for constructive control by adding candidates
(constructive AC control). The situation regarding voter control is quite different: As
shown in the next three theorems, maximin is resistant to all basic types of constructive
and destructive voter control.
Theorem 4.4. Maximin is resistant to constructive and destructive AV control.
Proof. We will first give an NP-hardness proof for the constructive case and then we will
describe how to modify it for the destructive case.
We now give a reduction of the X3C problem to the constructive maximin-AV problem.
Our input X3C instance is (B,S), where B = {b1, . . . , b3k} is a set of 3k distinct elements
and S = {S1, . . . , Sn} is a family of n 3-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality,
we assume k ≥ 1. Our reduction outputs the following instance. We have an election
E = (C, V ), where C = B ∪ {p, d} and V = (v1, . . . , v4k). There are 2k voters with
preference order d > B > p, k voters with preference order p > B > d, and k voters
with preference order p > d > B. In addition, we have a collection W = (w1, . . . , wn) of
unregistered voters, where the i’th voter, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has preference order
B − Si > p > Si > d.
We claim that there is a subcollection W ′ ⊆ W such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ k and p is a unique
winner of election (C, V ∪W ′) if and only if (B,S) is a ”yes”-instance of X3C.
It is easy to verify that for each bi ∈ B it holds that NE(p, bi) = 2k, and that NE(p, d) =
2k. Thus, scoreE(p) = 2k. Similarly, it is easy to verify that scoreE(d) = 2k, and that for
each bi ∈ B, scoreE(bi) ≤ k. Let W
′′ be a subcollection of W such that ‖W ′′‖ ≤ k and let
E′′ = (C, V ∪W ′′). For each bi ∈ B it holds that scoreE′′(bi) ≤ 2k. Since each voter in W
ranks d as the least desirable candidate, scoreE′′(d) = 2k. What is p’s score in election E
′′?
If there exists a candidate bi ∈ B such that there is no voter wj in W
′′ that prefers p to bi,
then scoreE′′(p) = 2k (because NE′′(p, bi) = 2k). Otherwise, scoreE′′(p) ≥ 2k + 1. Thus, p
is a unique winner of E′′ if and only if W ′′ corresponds to an exact cover of B. This proves
our claim and, as the reduction is clearly computable in polynomial time, concludes the
proof for the constructive maximin-AC case.
To show that destructive maximin-AC is NP-hard, we use the same reduction, except
that we remove from V a single voter with preference list p > B > d, and we set the task
to preventing d from being a unique winner. Removing a p > B > d voter from V ensures
that before we start adding candidates, d has score 2k (and this score cannot be changed),
p has score 2k− 1 (and p needs to get one point extra over each other candidate to increase
his or her score and prevent d from being a unique winner), and each bi ∈ B has score
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k − 1 (thus, no candidate in B can obtain score higher than 2k − 1 via adding no more
than k candidates from W ). The same reasoning as for the constructive case proves that
the reduction correctly reduces X3C to destructive maximin-AV.
Theorem 4.5. Maximin is resistant to constructive and destructive DV control.
Proof. We will first show NP-hardness for constructive maximin-DV control and then we
will argue how to modify the construction to obtain the result for the destructive case.
Our reduction is from X3C. Let (B,S) be our input X3C instance, where B =
{b1, . . . , b3k}, S = {S1, . . . , Sn}, and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ‖Si‖ = 3. Without loss of
generality, we assume that n ≥ k ≥ 3 (if n < k then S does not contain a cover of B, and
if k ≤ 2 we can solve the problem by brute force). We form an election E = (C, V ), where
C = B ∪ {p, d} and where V = V ′ ∪ V ′′, V ′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
2n), V
′′ = (v′′1 , . . . , v
′′
2n−k+2). For
each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, voter v′i has preference order
d > B − Si > p > Si
and voter v′n+i has preference order
d >
←−
Si > p >
←−−−−
B − Si.
Among the voters in V ′′ we have: 2 voters with preference order p > d > B, n − k voters
with preference order p > B > d, and n voters with preference order B > p > d. We claim
that it is possible to ensure that p is a unique winner of election E via deleting at most k
voters if and only if (B,S) is a “yes”-instance of X3C.
Via routine calculation we see that candidates in election E have the following scores:
1. scoreE(d) = 2n (because NE(d, p) = 2n and for each bi ∈ B, NE(d, bi) = 2n+ 2),
2. scoreE(p) = 2n−k+2 (because NE(p, d) = 2n−k+2 and for each bi ∈ B, NE(p, bi) =
2n− k + 2), and
3. for each bi ∈ B, scoreE(bi) ≤ 2n− k (because NE(bi, d) = 2n− k).
Before any voters are deleted, d is the unique winner with k − 2 more points than p. Via
deleting at most k voters it is possible to decrease d’s score at most by k points. Let W be
a collection of voters such that p is the unique winner of E′ = (C, V −W ). We partition
W into W ′ ∪ W ′′, where W ′ contains those members of W that belong to V ′ and W ′′
contains those members of W that belong to V ′′. We claim that W ′′ is empty. For the
sake of contradiction let us assume that W ′′ 6= ∅. Let E′′ = (C, V −W ′′). Since every
voter in V ′′ prefers p to d, we have that NE′′(p, d) = NE(p, d) − ‖W
′′‖ and, as a result,
scoreE′′(p) ≤ scoreE(p) − ‖W
′′‖. In addition, assuming W ′′ is not empty, it is easy to
observe that scoreE′′(d) ≥ scoreE(d) − ‖W
′′‖ + 1 (the reason for this is that deleting any
single member of V ′′ does not decrease d’s score). That is, we have that:
scoreE′′(p) ≤ 2n− k + 2− ‖W
′′‖,
scoreE′′(d) ≥ 2n+ 1− ‖W
′′‖.
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So in E′′, d has at least k − 1 more points than p. Since ‖W ′′‖ ≥ 1, we can delete at most
k− 1 voters W ′ from election E′′. But then p will not be a unique winner of E′, which is a
contradiction.
Thus, W contains members of V ′ only. Since d is ranked first in every vote in V ′,
deleting voters from W decreases d’s score by exactly ‖W‖. Further, deleting voters W
certainly decreases p’s score by at least one point. Thus, after deleting voters W we have:
1. scoreE′(d) = 2n− ‖W‖,
2. scoreE′(p) ≤ 2n− k + 2− 1 = 2n − k + 1.
In consequence, the only possibility that p is a unique winner after deleting voters W is that
‖W‖ = k and we have equality in item 2 above. It is easy to verify that this equality holds
if and only if W contains k voters among v′1, . . . , v
′
n that correspond to an exact cover of B
via sets from S (recall that k ≥ 3). This proves that our reduction is correct, and since the
reduction is clearly computable in polynomial time, completes the proof of NP-hardness of
constructive maximin-DV control.
Let us now consider the destructive case. Let (B,S) be our input X3C instance (with B
and S as in the constructive case). We form election E = (C, V ) which is identical to the one
created in the constructive case, except that V ′′ = (v′′1 , . . . , v
′′
2n−k) and we set these voters’
preference orders as follows: There is one voter with preference order p > d > B, n − k
voters with preference order p > B > d, and n− 1 voters with preference order B > p > d.
(That is, compared to the constructive case, we remove one voter with preference order
p > d > B and one with preference order B > p > d.) It is easy to see that d is the unique
winner of election E and we claim that he or she can be prevented from being a unique
winner via deleting at most k voters if and only if there is an exact cover of B by k sets
from S.
Via routine calculation, it is easy to verify that scoreE(d) = 2n, and that scoreE(p) =
2n−k. The former holds because NE(d, p) = 2n and NE(d, bi) = 2n+1 and the latter holds
because NE(p, d) = 2n−k and for each candidate bi ∈ B we have NE(p, bi) = 2n−k+1. In
addition, each candidate bi ∈ B has score at most 2n− k− 1. Thus, it is possible to ensure
that d is not a unique winner via deleting at most k voters if and only if there are exactly k
voters deleting whom would decrease the score of d by k points and would not decrease p’s
score. Let us assume that such a collection of voters exists and let W be such a collection.
Since every voter in V ′′ prefers p to d, clearly W does not contain any voter in V ′′. Thus,
W contains exactly k voters from V ′. Since for each bi ∈ B we have NE(p, bi) = 2n− k+1,
for each bi ∈ B W contains at most one voter who prefers p to bi. Since ‖B‖ = 3k and
k ≥ 3, this implies that W contains exactly a collection of voters corresponding to some
exact cover of B by sets in S. This completes the proof for the destructive case.
4.3 Bribery in Maximin
We now move on to bribery in maximin. Given the previous results, it is not surprising that
maximin is resistant both to constructive bribery and to destructive bribery. Our proof is
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an application of the “UV technique” of Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a]. Very informally, the
idea is to build an election in a way that ensures that the briber is limited to bribing only
those voters who rank two special candidates ahead of the preferred one.
Theorem 4.6. Maximin is resistant to constructive and destructive BV control.
Proof. Our proofs follow via reductions from X3C. The reduction for the constructive case
is almost identical the one for the constructive case and thus we will consider both cases in
parallel.
Our reductions work as follows. Let (B,S) be an instance of X3C, where B =
{b1, . . . , b3k} is a set of 3k distinct elements, and S = {S1, . . . , Sn} is a family of 3-element
subsets of B. (Without loss of generality, we assume that n > k > 1. If this is not the case,
it is trivial to verify if (B,S) is a “yes” instance of X3C.) We construct a set of candidates
C = {p, d, s}∪B, where p is our preferred candidate (the goal in the constructive setting is
to ensure p is a unique winner) and d is our despised candidate (the goal in the destructive
setting is to prevent d from being a unique winner). We construct six collections of voters,
V 1, V 2, V 3, V 4, V 5, V 6, as follows:
1. V 1 contains 2n voters, v11, . . . , v
1
2n. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, voters v
1
i and v
1
i+n have the
following preference orders:
v1i : d > s > Si > p > B − Si
v1n+i :
←−−−−
B − Si > p >
←−
Si > d > s.
2. V 2 contains 2k voters, v21 , . . . , v
2
2k. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, voters v
2
i and v
2
i+k have the
following preference orders:
v2i : s > d > p > B
v2k+i :
←−
B > d > p > s.
3. V 3 contains 2k voters, v31 , . . . , v
3
2k. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, voters v
3
i and v
3
i+k have the
following preference orders:
v3i : d > s > p > B
v3k+i :
←−
B > s > p > d.
4. V 4 contains 4k voters, v41 , . . . , v
4
4k. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, voters v
4
i and v
4
i+2k have
the following preference orders:
v4i : d > B > p > s
v42k+i : s > p > d >
←−
B.
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(a) Values of NEc(·, ·).
p d s B
p – n+ 3k + 2 n+ 3k + 2 n+ 4k + 1
d n+ 5k + 1 – 2n+ 4k + 2 n+ 6k + 2
s n+ 5k + 1 4k + 1 – n+ 4k + 2
B n+ 4k + 2 n+ 2k + 1 n+ 4k + 1 ≤ n+ 4k + 2
(b) Values of NEd(·, ·).
p d s B
p – n+ 3k + 1 n+ 3k + 1 n+ 4k
d n+ 5k + 1 – 2n+ 4k + 1 n+ 6k + 1
s n+ 5k + 1 4k + 1 – n+ 4k + 1
B n+ 4k + 2 n+ 2k + 1 n+ 4k + 1 n+ 4k + 1
Table 1: Values of NEc(·, ·) and NEd(·, ·) for each pair of candidates. Let E be one of
Ec, Ed. An entry in row c
′ ∈ {p, d, s} and column c′′ ∈ {p, d, s}, c′ 6= c′′, of the appropriate
table above gives value NE(c
′, c′′). For row B and for column B we adopt the following
convention. For each c ∈ {p, d, s} and for each bi ∈ B, an entry in row B and column c is
equal to NE(bi, c). For each c ∈ {p, d, s} and for each bi ∈ B, an entry in row c and column
B is equal to NE(c, bi). For each two distinct bi, bj ∈ B, the entry in row B and column B
is the upper bound on NE(bi, bj). (For Ed this entry is, in fact, exact.)
5. V 5 contains 2 voters, v51 , v
5
2 with the following preference orders
v51 : s > B > p > d
v52 : d >
←−
B > p > s.
6. V 6 contains a single voter, v61 , with preference order p > d > s > B.
We form two elections, Ec and Ed, where Ec = (C, V
1 ∪ · · · ∪ V 6) and Ed = (C, V
1 ∪
· · · ∪ V 5); that is, Ec and Ed are identical except Ed does not contain the single voter from
V 6. Ec contains 2n+ 8k + 3 voters and Ed contains 2n+ 8k + 2 voters. Values of NEc and
NEd for each pair of candidates are given in Table 1.
For the constructive case, we claim that it is possible to ensure that p is a unique winner
of election Ec by bribing at most k voters if and only if (B,S) is a “yes” instance of X3C.
Let us now prove this claim. By inspecting Table 1, and recalling that n > k > 1, we see
that scoreEc(p) = n + 3k + 2, scoreEc(d) = n + 5k + 1, scoreEc(s) = 4k + 1, and for each
bi ∈ B, scoreEc(bi) ≤ n+ 2k + 1. That is, prior to any bribing, d is the unique winner and
p has the second highest score.
It is easy to see that by bribing t ≤ k voters, the briber can change each candidate’s
score by at most t points. Thus, for the bribery to be successful, the briber has to bribe
exactly k voters in such a way that d’s score decreases to n+4k+1 and p’s score increases
25
to n + 4k + 2. To achieve this, the briber has to find a collection V ′ of voters such that
‖V ′‖ = k, and
1. each voter in V ′ ranks p below both d and s, and
2. for each bi ∈ B, there is a voter in V
′ who ranks p below bi.
The only voters that satisfy the first condition are v11 , . . . , v
1
n, v
2
1 , . . . , v
2
k, v
3
1 , . . . , v
3
k. Further,
among these voters only v11 , . . . , v
1
n rank p below some member of B and, in fact, for each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, v1i ranks p below exactly three members of B. Thus, it is easy to see that each
k voters from v11 , . . . , v
1
n, v
2
1 , . . . , v
2
k, v
3
1 , . . . , v
3
k that satisfy the second condition correspond
naturally to a cover of B by sets from S. (Note that it suffices that the briber bribes voters
in V ′ to rank p first without changing the votes in any other way, and that changing the
votes in any other way than ranking p first is not necessary.) As a result, if it is possible to
ensure that p is a winner of Ec by bribing at most k voters then (B,S) is a “yes” instance
of X3C. For the other direction, it is easy to verify that if (B,S) is a “yes” instance of X3C
then bribing k voters from v11 , . . . , v
1
n that correspond to a cover of B to rank p first suffices
to ensure that p is a unique winner. This completes the proof for the constructive case.
For the destructive case, we claim that it is possible to ensure that d is not a unique
winner of Ed if and only if (B,S) is a “yes” instance of X3C. The proof is analogous to the
constructive case: It suffices to note that p is the only candidate that can possibly tie for
victory with d. The rest of the proof proceeds as for the constructive case.
4.4 Connection to Dodgson Voting
We conclude our discussion of (control in) maximin voting with a small detour, showing a
connection between maximin and the famous voting rule (i.e., election system) of Dodgson.
Dodgson voting, proposed in the 19th century by Charles Lutwidge Dodgson,10 works
as follows [Dod76]. Let E = (C, V ) be an election, where C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V =
(v1, . . . , vn). For a candidate ci ∈ C, the Dodgson score of ci, denoted score
D
E (ci), is the
smallest number of sequential swaps of adjacent candidates on the preference lists of voters
in V needed to make ci become the Condorcet winner. The candidates with the lowest
score are the Dodgson election’s winners. That is, Dodgson defined his system to elect
those candidates that are closest to being Condorcet winners in the sense of adjacent-swaps
distance. Although Dodgson’s eighteenth-century election system was directly defined in
terms of distance, there remains ongoing interest in understanding the classes of voting
rules that can be captured in various distance-based frameworks (see, e.g., [MN08,EFS09]).
Unfortunately, it is known that deciding whether a given candidate is a winner
according to Dodgson’s rule is quite complex. In fact, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaan-
dra, and Rothe [HHR97], strengthening an NP-hardness result of Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT89b], showed that this problem is complete for parallelized access to NP. That
is, it is complete for the Θp2 level of the polynomial hierarchy. Nonetheless, many re-
searchers have sought efficient ways of computing Dodgson winners, for example by using
10Dodgson is better known as Lewis Carroll, the renowned author of “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.”
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frequently correct heuristics [HH09,MPS08], fixed-parameter tractability (see [BTT89b,
FHH09a,BGN10] and the discussion in Footnote 17 of [FHHR09a]), and approximation
algorithms for Dodgson scores [CCF+09].
In addition to its high computational cost in determining winners, Dodgson’s rule is
often criticized for not having basic properties one would expect a good voting rule to have.
For example, Dodgson’s rule is not “weakCondorcet consistent” (equivalently, it does not
satisfy Fishburn’s “strict Condorcet principle”) [BBHH10] and doesn’t satisfy homogeneity
and monotonicity (see [Bra09], which surveys a number of defects of Dodgson’s rule). We
provide definitions for the latter two notions, as they will be relevant to this section.
Homogeneity. We say that a voting ruleR is homogeneous if for each election E = (C, V ),
where C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn), it holds that R has the same winner
set on E as on E′ = (C, V ′), where V ′ = (v1, v1, v2, v2, . . . , vn, vn).
Monotonicity. We say that a voting rule R is monotone if for each election E = (C, V ),
where C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn), it holds that if some candidate ci ∈ C
is a winner of E then ci is also a winner of an election E
′ that is identical to E
except that some voters rank ci higher (without changing the relative order of all the
remaining candidates).
Continuing the Caragiannis et al. [CCF+09] line of research on approximately comput-
ing Dodgson scores, Caragiannis et al. [CKKP10] devised an approximation algorithm for
computing Dodgson scores that, given an election E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} and
V = (v1, . . . , vn) and a candidate ci in C, computes in polynomial time a nonnegative inte-
ger scE(ci) such that score
D
E (ci) ≤ scE(ci) and scE(ci) = O(m logm) · score
D
E (ci). That is,
the algorithm given by Caragiannis et al. [CKKP10] is, in a natural sense, an O(m logm)-
approximation of the Dodgson score.11 This algorithm has additional properties: If one
defines a voting rule to elect those candidates that have lowest scores according to the algo-
rithm, then that voting rule is Condorcet consistent (i.e., when a Condorcet winner exists,
he or she is the one and only winner under the voting rule), homogeneous, and monotone.
The result of Caragiannis et al. [CKKP10] is very interesting, but unfortunately the
voting rule defined by their approximation algorithm is somewhat complicated and arguably
might seem not to be very natural. We now show that the maximin rule—which like the
Caragiannis et al. rule is Condorcet-consistent, homogeneous, and monotone, but which in
addition is a long-existing and natural rule—also elects candidates that are, in a certain
different yet precise sense, “close” to being Dodgson winners. Our proof is inspired by that
of Caragiannis et al. [CKKP10].
11Throughout this section, we use the notion “f(m)-approximation of g” in the sense it is typically used
when dealing with minimization problems. That is, we mean that the approximation outputs a value that
is at least g and at most f(m) · g. We slightly abuse the interaction between this notation and Big-Oh
notation, in the quite standard and intuitive way. And we assume that the argument domain that g and the
approximation share is clear from context—in this paper, their arguments are an election E and a candidate
ci.
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Theorem 4.7. Let E = (C, V ) be an election and let W ⊆ C be a set of candidates that
win in E according to the maximin rule. Let m = ‖C‖ and let s = minci∈C score
D
E (ci). For
each ci ∈W it holds that s ≤ score
D
E (ci) ≤ m
2s.
Proof. Let us fix an election E = (C, V ) with C = {c1, . . . cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn). For
each two candidates ci, cj ∈ C we define dfE(ci, cj) to be the smallest number k such that
if k voters in V changed their preference order to rank ci ahead of cj, then ci would be
preferred to cj by more than half of the voters. Note that if for some ci, cj ∈ C we have
dfE(ci, cj) > 0 then
NE(ci, cj) + dfE(ci, cj) =
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1.
For each candidate ci ∈ C we define sc
′
E(ci) to be
sc′E(ci) = m
2max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C − {ci}}.
We now prove that sc′ is an m2-approximation of the Dodgson score.
Lemma 4.8. For each ci ∈ C it holds that score
D
E (ci) ≤ sc
′
E(ci) ≤ m
2scoreDE (ci).
Proof. Let us fix some ci ∈ C. To see that the second inequality in the lemma statement
holds, note that max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C − {ci}} ≤
∑
cj∈C−{ci}
dfE(ci, cj) ≤ score
D
E (ci)
because for each candidate ck we, at least, have to perform dfE(ci, ck) swaps to ensure that
ci defeats ck in their majority head-to-head contest. Thus, after multiplying by m
2, we have
m2max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C − {ci}} ≤ m
2scoreDE (ci).
Let us now consider the first inequality. Let ck be some candidate in C − {ci}. To make
sure that ci is ranked higher than ck by more than half of the voters, we can shift ci to
the first position in the preference lists of max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C − {ci}} ≥ dfE(ci, ck)
voters (or, all the remaining voters if less than max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C − {ci}} voters do
not rank ci as their top choice). This requires at most m adjacent swaps per voter. Since
there are m− 1 candidates in C − {ci}, m
2max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C −{ci}} adjacent swaps
are certainly sufficient to make ci a Condorcet winner. (Lemma 4.8)
It remains to show that if some candidate ci is a maximin winner in E then sc
′
E(ci) is
minimal. Fortunately, this is easy to see. If some candidate ci is a Condorcet winner of
E then he or she is the unique maximin winner and he or she is the unique candidate ci
with sc′E(ci) = 0. Let us assume that there is no Condorcet winner of E. Let us fix some
candidate ci ∈ C and let ck ∈ C − {ci} be a candidate such that sc
′
E(ci) = m
2dfE(ci, ck).
That is, dfE(ci, ck) = max{dfE(ci, cj) | cj ∈ C − {ci}} and dfE(ci, ck) > 0. Due to this last
fact and our choice of ck, we have dfE(ci, ck) =
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1−NE(ci, ck) and so
NE(ci, ck) =
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1− dfE(ci, ck) = min
cj∈C−{ci}
NE(ci, cj) = scoreE(ci),
where scoreE(ci) is the maximin score of ci in E. Thus each candidate ci with the lowest
value sc′E(ci) also has the highest maximin score.
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Theorem 4.7 says that every maximin winner’s Dodgson score is no less than the Dodgson
score of the Dodgson winner(s) (that fact of course holds trivially), and is no more than
m2 times the Dodgson score of the Dodgson winner(s). That is, we have proven that no
candidate whose Dodgson score is more than m2 times that of the Dodgson winner(s) can
be a maximin winner.
Since maximin is Condorcet consistent, homogeneous, and monotone, our result inter-
estingly relates to the approximation of Caragiannis et al. [CKKP10], who achieved an
O(m logm)-approximation of Dodgson score while maintaining Condorcet consistency, ho-
mogeneity and monotonicity (recall the discussion before Theorem 4.7). Admittedly, our
“closeness” factor is m2, which is worse than achieving O(m logm). And our closeness is
in a different sense, since our theorem is applying its bound just between Dodgson scores,
and just on the winner set. In contrast, Caragiannis et al. [CKKP10] and even our own
Lemma 4.8 relate the Dodgson score to the Caragiannis et al. score and the sc′ score, and
those approximations hold for all candidates. However, we achieve our m2 closeness factor
for a voting rule, maximin, that is well known and natural.
5 Fixed-Parameter Tractability
In this section we consider the parameterized complexity of multipronged control, in par-
ticular, the case where we can assume that the number of candidates is a small constant.
Elections with few candidates are very natural: For example, in many countries presidential
elections involve only a handful of candidates. The reader can easily imagine many other
examples.
The main result of this section is that for many natural election systems E (formally,
for all election systems whose winner determination problem can be expressed via an inte-
ger linear program of a certain form), it holds that the E-AC+DC+AV+BV+BV control
problem is fixed-parameter tractable (is in the complexity class FPT) for the parameter
“number of candidates,” both in the constructive setting and in the destructive setting.
This result combines and significantly enhances FPT results from the literature, in par-
ticular, from the papers [FHH09a,FHHR09a], which are the model for and inspiration of
this section. We also make explicit an “automatic” path to such results that is implicit
in [FHH09a,FHHR09a]. This path should be helpful in letting many future analyses be
done as tool-application exercises, rather than being case-by-case challenges.
In this section we focus exclusively on the number of candidates as our parameter. That
is, our parameter is the number of candidates initially in the election plus the number of
candidates (if any) in the set of potential additional candidates. That is, in terms of the
variables we have been using to describe multiprong control the parameter is ‖C‖+ ‖A‖.
We mention that researchers sometimes analyze other parameterizations. For example,
Liu et al. [LFZL09], Liu and Zhu [LZ10], and Betzler and Uhlmann [BU09] consider as
the parameter the amount of change that one is allowed to use (e.g., the number of candi-
dates one can add), Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b], Betzler and Uhlmann [BU09],
and Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a] study as the parameter the number of voters (and also
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sometimes the number of candidates). And other parameters are sometimes used when
considering the so-called possible winner problem, see, e.g., [BD09,BHN09]. However, we
view the parameter “number of candidates” as the most essential and the most natural one.
We now proceed with our discussion of fixed-parameter tractability, with the number of
candidates as the parameter.
Let us consider an election system E and a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of candidates. There are
exactlym! preference orders over the candidates in C and we will refer to them as o1, . . . , om!.
Let us assume that E is anonymous (i.e., the winners of each E election do not depend on
the order of votes or the names of the voters, but only—for each preference order oi—on
the number of votes with that preference order). We define predicate winE(cj , n1, . . . , nm!)
to be true if and only if ci is a unique winner of E elections with C = {c1, . . . , cm}, where
for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, there are exactly ni voters with preference order oi. For the rest
of this section, our inequalities always use one of the four operators “>,” “≥,” “<,” and
“≤.”12
Definition 5.1. We say that an anonymous election system E is unique-winner (nonunique-
winner) integer-linear-program implementable if for each set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm}
and each candidate cj ∈ C there exists a set S of linear inequalities with variables n1, . . . , nm!
such that:
1. If the integer assignment n1 = nˆ1, . . ., nm! = nˆm! satisfies S, then each nˆi belongs to
N,13
2. S can be computed (i.e., obtained) in time polynomial in m!,14 and
3. for each (nˆ1, . . . , nˆm!) ∈ N
m!, we have that (a) holds if and only if (b) holds, where (a)
and (b) are as follows:
(a) S is satisfied by the assignment n1 = nˆ1, . . ., nm! = nˆm!.
12We allow both strict and nonstrict inequalities. Since we allow only integer solutions, it is easy to
simulate strict inequalities with nonstrict ones and to simulate nonstrict inequalities with strict ones, in
both cases simply by adding a “1” to the appropriate site of the inequality. So we could equally well have
allowed just strict, or just nonstrict, inequalities.
13It is easy to to put m! inequalities into S enforcing this condition. And this condition will help us make
the electoral part of our definition meaningful, i.e., it will avoid having problems from the restriction in the
final part of this definition that lets us avoid discussing negative numbers of voters.
14We mention in passing that if the m! in this part of the definition were changed to any other computable
function of m, e.g., mm
m
m
, we would still obtain FPT results, and still would have them hold even in the
strengthened version of FPT in which the f of “f(parameter) · InputsizeO(1)” is required to be computable.
However, due to m! being the number of preference orders over m candidates, having S be obtainable in
time polynomial in m! will in practice be a particularly common case.
We also mention in passing that the FPT-establishing framework in this section and the results it yields,
similarly to the case in our work mentioned earlier [FHH09a,FHHR09a], not only will apply in the model
where votes are input as a list of ballots, one per person, but also will hold in the so-called “succinct” model
(see [FHH09a,FHHR09a]), in which we are given the votes not as individual ballots but as binary numbers
providing the number of voters having each preference order (or having each occurring preference order).
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(b) cj is a unique winner (is a winner) of an E election in which for each i, 1 ≤
i ≤ m!, there are exactly nˆi voters with preference order oi, where oi is the i’th
preference order over the set C.
In a slight abuse of notation, for integer-linear-program implementable election sys-
tems E we will simply refer to the set S of linear inequalities from Definition 5.1 as
winE (cj , n1, . . . , nm!). The particular set of candidates will always be clear from context.
Naturally, it is easy to adapt Definition 5.1 to apply to approval voting, but for the sake of
brevity we will not do so.
We are not aware of any natural systems that are integer-linear-program unique-winner
implementable yet not integer-linear-program nonunique-winner implementable, or vice
versa. In this paper we focus on the unique winner model so the reader may wonder
why we defined the nonunique winner variant of integer-linear-program implementability.
The answer is that, as we will see later in this section, it is a useful notion when dealing
with destructive control.
The class of election systems that are integer-linear-program implementable is remark-
ably broad. For example, it is variously implicit in or a consequence of the results
of [FHH09a] that plurality, veto, Borda, Dodgson, and each polynomial-time computable
(in the number of candidates) family of scoring protocols are integer-linear-program imple-
mentable.15 For many other election systems (e.g., Kemeny [Kem59,YL78] and Copeland)
it is not clear whether they are integer-linear-program implementable, but there are similar
approaches that will be as useful for us. We will return to this issue at the end of this
section.
Theorem 5.2. Let E be an integer-linear-program unique-winner implementable election
system. For number of candidates as the parameter, constructive E-AC+DC+AV+DV+BV
is in FPT.
Proof. Let (C,A, V,W, p, kAC, kDC, kAV, kDV, kBV) be our input instance of the construc-
tive E-AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control problem, as described in Definition 3.1. Let C =
{p, c1, . . . , cm′} and A = {a1, . . . , am′′}. Our parameter, the total number of candidates, is
m = m′+m′′+1. For each subset K of C∪A we let oK1 , . . . , o
K
‖K‖! mean the ‖K‖! preference
orders over K.
The idea of our algorithm is to perform an exhaustive search through all the subsets of
candidates K, K ⊆ C∪A, and for each K check whether (a) it is possible to obtain K from
C by deleting at most kDC candidates and adding at most kAC candidates from A, and (b)
it is possible to ensure that p is a unique winner of election (K,V ) by deleting at most kDV
voters, adding at most kAV voters from W , and bribing at most kBV voters. Given K, step
15Let m be the number of candidates. A scoring protocol is a vector of m nonnegative integers satisfying
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. Each candidate receives αi points for each vote that ranks him or her in the i’th
position, and the candidate(s) with most points win. Many election systems can be viewed as families of
scoring protocols. For example, plurality is defined by scoring protocols of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), veto is
defined by scoring protocols of the form (1, . . . , 1, 0), and Borda is defined by scoring protocols of the form
(m− 1, m− 2, . . . , 0), where m is the number of candidates.
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(a) can easily be implemented in polynomial time. To implement step (b), we introduce a
linear integer program P (K), which is satisfiable if and only if step (b) holds. Let us now
fix K ⊆ C ∪A and describe the integer linear program P (K).
We assume that p ∈ K as it is not legal to delete p (and it would be pointless, given
that we want to ensure his or her victory). We interpret preference orders of voters in V
and W as limited to the candidate set K. We use the following constants in our program.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, we let nVi be the number of voters in V with preference order o
K
i ,
and we let nWi be the number of voters in W with preference order o
K
i . P (K) contains the
following variables (described together with their intended interpretation):
Variables av1, . . . , av‖K‖!. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, we interpret avi as the number of
voters with preference oKi that we add from W .
Variables dv1, . . . , dv‖K‖!. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, we interpret dvi as the number of
voters with preference oKi that we delete from V .
Variables bv1,1, bv1,2, . . . , bv1,‖K‖!, bv2,1, . . . , bv‖K‖!,‖K‖!. For each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤
‖K‖!, we interpret bvi,j as the number of voters with preference o
K
i that, in case
i 6= j, we bribe to switch to preference order oKj , or, in case i = j, we leave unbribed.
P (K) contains the following constraints.
1. All the variables have nonnegative values.
2. For each variable avi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, there are enough voters in W with preference
order oKi to be added. That is, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, we have a constraint
avi ≤ n
W
i . Altogether, we can add at most kAV voters so we have a constraint∑‖K‖!
i=1 avi ≤ kAV.
3. For each variable dvi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, there are enough voters in V with preference
order oKi to be deleted. That is, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, we have a constraint
dvi ≤ n
V
i . Altogether, we can delete at most kDV voters so we have a constraint∑‖K‖!
i=1 dvi ≤ kDV.
4. For each variable bvi,j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ‖K‖!, there are enough voters with preference o
K
i
to be bribed. That is, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, we have a constraint
∑‖K‖!
j=1 bvi,j =
nVi + avi − dvi (the equality comes from the fact that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖K‖!, bvi,i
is the number of voters with preference oKi that we do not bribe). Altogether, we can
bribe at most kBV voters so we also have a constraint
‖K‖!∑
i=1
‖K‖!∑
j=1
bvi,j

−
‖K‖!∑
i=1
bvi,i ≤ kBV.
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5. Candidate p is the unique winner of the election after we have executed all the adding,
deleting, and bribing of voters. Using the fact that E is integer-linear-program unique-
winner implementable, we can express this as winE(p, ℓ1, . . . , ℓ‖K‖!), where we sub-
stitute each ℓj, 1 ≤ j ≤ ‖K‖!, by
∑‖K‖!
i=1 bvi,j (note that, by previous constraints,
variables describing bribery already take into account adding and deleting voters).
This is a legal integer-linear-program constraint as winE(p, ℓ1, . . . , ℓ‖K‖!) is simply a
conjunction of linear inequalities over ℓ1, . . . , ℓ‖K‖!.
The number of variables and the number of inequalities in P (K) are each polynomially
bounded in m!. Keeping in mind Definitions 3.1 and 5.1, it is easy to see that program
P (K) does exactly what we expect it to. And testing whether P (K) is satisfiable (i.e., has
an integer solution, as we are in the framework of an integer linear program) is in FPT,
with respect to the number of candidates being our parametrization, by using Lenstra’s
algorithm [Len83]. Thus our complete FPT algorithm for the E-AC+DC+AV+DV+BV
problem works as follows. For each subset K of C ∪ A that includes p we execute the
following two steps:
1. Check whether it is possible to obtain K from C by deleting at most kDC candidates
and by adding at most kAC candidates from A.
2. Form linear program P (K) and check whether it has any integral solutions using the
algorithm of Lenstra [Len83]. Accept if so.
If after trying all sets K we have not accepted, then reject.
From the previous discussion, this algorithm is correct. Also, since (a) there are exactly
2m−1 sets K to try, (b) executing the first step above can be done in time polynomial
in m, and (c) the second step is in FPT (given that m is the parameter), constructive
E-AC+DC+AV+DV+BV is in FPT for parameter m.
The above theorem deals with constructive control only. However, using its proof, it is
easy to prove a destructive variant of the result. We say that an election system is strongly
voiced [HHR07] if it holds that whenever there is at least one candidate, there is at least
one winner.
Corollary 5.3. Let E be a strongly voiced, integer-linear-program nonunique-winner imple-
mentable election system. Destructive E-AC+DC+AV+DV+BV is in FPT for the param-
eter number of candidates.
To see that the corollary holds, it is enough to note that for strongly voiced election
systems a candidate can be prevented from being a unique winner if and only if some other
candidate can be made a (possibly nonunique) winner (see e.g., Footnote 5 of [HHR07]
for a relevant discussion). Thus to prove Corollary 5.3, we can simply use an algorithm
that for each candidate other than the despised one sees whether that candidate can be
made a (perhaps nonunique) winner, and if any can be made a (perhaps nonunique) win-
ner, declares destructive control achievable. (And the precise integer linear programming
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feasibility problem solution given by Lenstra’s algorithm will reveal what action achieves
the control.) This can be done in FPT using the algorithm from the proof of Theorem 5.2,
adapted to work for the nonunique-winner problem (this is trivial given that Corollary 5.3
assumes that E is integer-linear-program nonunique-winner implementable).
Let us now go back to the issue that some election systems may not be integer-linear-
program implementable. As an example, let us consider maximin. Let E = (C, V ) be
an election, where C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V = (v1, . . . , vn). As before, by o1, . . . , om! we
mean the m! possible preference orders over C, and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, by ni we
mean the number of voters in V that report preference order oi. For each ci and cj in C,
ci 6= cj , we let O(ci, cj) be the set of preference orders over C where ci is preferred to cj . Let
k = (k1, . . . , km) be a vector of nonnegative integers such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it holds
that 1 ≤ ki ≤ m. For such a vector k and a candidate cℓ ∈ C we define M(cℓ, k1, . . . , km)
to be the following set of linear integer inequalities:
1. For each candidate ci, his or her maximin score is equal to NE(ci, cki). That is, for
each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, i 6= j, we have constraint
∑
ok∈O(ci,cki)
nk ≤
∑
ok∈O(ci,cj)
nk
2. cℓ has the highest maximin score in election E and thus is the unique winner of
E. That is, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= ℓ, we have constraint
∑
ok∈O(cℓ,ckℓ)
nk >∑
ok∈O(ci,cki)
nk.
It is easy to see that cℓ is a unique maximin winner of E if and only if there is a vector k =
(k1, . . . , km) such that all inequalities of M(cℓ, k1, . . . , km) are satisfied. It is also clear how
to modify the above construction to handle the nonunique winner case. Since there are only
O(mm) vectors k to try and each M(cℓ, k1, . . . , km) contains O(m
2) inequalities, it is easy
to modify the proof of Theorem 5.2 to work for maximin: Assuming that one is interested
in ensuring candidate cℓ’s victory, one simply has to replace program P (K) in the proof of
Theorem 5.2 with a family of programs that each include a different M(cℓ, k1, . . . , km) for
testing if cℓ had won. And one would accept if any of these were satisfiable. Thus we have
the following result.
Corollary 5.4. Constructive AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control and destructive
AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control are both in FPT for maximin for the parameter number of
candidates.
The above construction for the winner problem in maximin can be viewed as, in effect,
a disjunction of a set of integer linear programs. Such constructions for the winner problem
have already been obtained for Kemeny in [FHH09a] and for Copeland in [FHHR09a]. Thus
we have the following theorem.
Corollary 5.5. With number of candidates as the parameter, constructive
AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control and destructive AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control are in
FPT for Kemeny and, for each each rational α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, for Copelandα.
34
We conclude with an important caveat. The FPT algorithms of this section are very
broad in their coverage, but in practice they would be difficult to use as their running time
depends on (the fixed-value parameter) m in a very fast-growing way and as Lenstra’s algo-
rithm has a large multiplicative constant in its polynomial running time. Thus the results
of this section should best be interpreted as indicating that, for multipronged control in our
setting, it is impossible to prove non-FPT-ness (and so it clearly is impossible to prove fixed-
parameter hardness in terms of the levels of the so-called “W” hierarchy of fixed-parameter
complexity, unless that hierarchy collapses to FPT). If one is interested in truly practically
implementing a multipronged control attack, one should probably devise a problem-specific
algorithm rather than using our very generally applicable FPT construction.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that combining various types of control into multiprong control attacks is
a useful technique. It allows us to study more realistic control models, to express control
vulnerability results and proofs in a compact way, and to obtain vulnerability results that
are stronger than would be obtained for single prongs alone.
The main finding of our paper is that, to the extent to which we can draw conclusions
from the set of election systems that we have studied, vulnerabilities to basic control types
can often be combined to form a vulnerability to their multipronged control combination.
(Table 2 summarizes our results regarding the five election systems we have focused on
in this paper.) However, we have also seen that there exists a natural election system
that is vulnerable to both constructive AC control and constructive AV control but that is
resistant to constructive AC+AV control. We have also shown that as far as fixed-parameter
tractability goes, at least with respect to the parameter number of candidates, a very broad
class of election systems is vulnerable to the full AC+DC+AV+DV+BV control attack.
And we have taken a small detour and proven that no candidate whose Dodgson score is
more than ‖C‖2 times the Dodgson winner’s score can be a maximin winner.
This paper studies multipronged control where the prongs may include various standard
types of control or bribery. However, it is easy to see that our framework can be naturally
extended to include manipulation. To do so, one would have to allow some of the voters—the
manipulators—to have blank preference orders and, if such voters were to be included in the
election, the controlling agent would have to decide on how to fill them in. It is interesting
that in this model the controlling agent might be able to add manipulative voters (if there
were manipulators among the voters that can be added) or even choose to delete them
(it may seem that deleting manipulators is never useful but Zuckerman, Procaccia, and
Rosenschein [ZPR09] give an example where deleting a manipulator is necessary to make
one’s favorite candidate a winner of a Copeland election).
We mention as a natural but involved open direction the study of multipronged control
in the setting where there are multiple controlling agents, each with a different goal, each
controlling a different prong. In such a setting, it is interesting to consider game-theoretic
scenarios as well as situations in which, for example, one of the controlling agents is seeking
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Control type plurality Condorcet Copeland0.5 approval maximin
Con. Des. Con. Des. Con. Des. Con. Des. Con. Des.
AC R R I V R V I V R V
ACu R R I V R V I V V V
DC R R V I R V V I V V
AV V V R V R R R V R R
DV V V R V R R R V R R
BV V V R V R R R V R R
Table 2: Resistance to basic control types for the five main election systems studied in this
paper. In the table, I means the system is immune to the given control type, R means
resistance, and V means vulnerability. As shown in this paper, for each of the five election
systems, all listed constructive vulnerabilities combine and all listed destructive vulnerabil-
ities combine. All remaining prongs combine as described by Corollary 3.6. Constructive
results for AC, ACu, DC, AV, and DV for plurality and Condorcet are due to [BTT92]
and their corresponding destructive results are due to [HHR07]. All results for AC ,ACu,
DC, AV, and DV for approval are due to [HHR07]. All results regarding Copeland, are due
to [FHHR09a]. Constructive bribery results for plurality and approval are due to [FHH09a],
and the constructive bribery result for Condorcet is implicit in [FHHR09a]. All the remain-
ing results (i.e., all results regarding maximin, and destructive bribery results for plurality,
approval, and Condorcet) are due to this paper.
an action that will succeed regardless of the action of the other attacker.
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